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COEXISTENCE STRATEGIES IN A BIOTECH WORLD: EXPLORING
STATUTORY GROWER PROTECTIONS
A. Bryan Endres
In politics, it is often said that where you stand depends upon
where you sit. The same holds true for the impact of genetic engineering
on farming. Conventional and organic growers often demand legislative
action to protect their farming methods from "contamination" by farmers
planting genetically engineered seeds, while farmers embracing
genetically engineered production practices seek liability protection and
the freedom to farm using their preferred production method. The object
of this article is not to rehash the potential environmental or health
benefits and risks of agricultural biotechnology,' but rather to investigate
the clash of cultures within production agriculture. This perspective is
dominated by the question of whether producers can meet market demands
while avoiding the risk of liability arising from the use of genetic
engineering technologies.
"Coexistence" describes one method of reconciling this question.
Perhaps the most commonly accepted definition of "coexistence" is from
the Commission of the European Communities: "[c]oexistence refers to
the ability of farmers to make a practical choice between conventional,
organic and GM-crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations
for labeling and/or purity standards." 2 Absent federal leadership in the
Assistant Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois. This material is based on work
supported by the Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service, US Department of
Agriculture, under Project No. ILLU-470-309. The author thanks Rohit Raghavan and Brian
George for their research assistance.
The potential for environmental harm from the use of genetically engineered seeds has been the
subject of considerable debate. See generally, MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, GENETIC ENGINEERING IN
AGRICULTURE: THE MYTHS, ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, AND ALTERNATIVES (2d ed. 2004) (detailing
environmental and health risks of agricultural biotechnology); Bruce M. Chassy et al., Crop
Biotechnology and the Future ofFood: A Scientific Assessment, CAST COMMENTARY, QTA 2005-
2 (Oct. 2005) available at http://www.cast-science.org/cast/src/cast top.htm; ENVIRONMENTAL
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSGENIC CROPS (J.H.H. Wesseler, ed., 2005) (discussing economic
costs of environmental harm resulting from the use of genetic engineering in agriculture). For
another interesting perspective on products liability and biotechnology, see Drew Kershen, Liability
for Refusing to Use Agricultural Biotechnology, 10 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 21 (2004).
2 Commission Recommendation 2003/556 On Guidelines for the Development of National
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United States on this issue, a "common law of coexistence" is emerging
from a combination of existing legal principles and collective market
transactions, tempered by preemptive state legislation. This ad hoc
development of coexistence strategies provides ample opportunity for
inspection and critique of the evolving patchwork of biotech regulation in
the United States.
After a background discussion regarding the concept of
coexistence in production agriculture in Section I of this article, Section II
provides a comparative context to the discussion by exploring formal
coexistence strategies in the European Union. Sections III and IV discuss
state and local legislation relating to agricultural biotechnology.
Specifically, Section III describes the increasingly popular concept of
"grower districts," GM-Free production zones and state legislative
responses to local government initiatives. Section IV explores and
critiques the unique coexistence strategy of producer-run variety licensing
boards. The article concludes by offering some observations regarding
future strategies for coexistence.
I. COEXISTENCE
Coexistence, from the production perspective, is an issue of
economics rather than health and safety. 3  Farmers cultivating varieties
derived from genetic engineering presumably purchase seed only after the
variety has cleared all regulatory requirements with respect to any
negative impacts on human health or the environment.4 The emphasis on
Strategies and Best Practices to Ensure the Coexistence of Genetically Modified Crops with
Conventional and Organic Farming, art. 1.1, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36, 39 [hereinafter Recommendation
2003/556].
3 Id. art. 1.2, at 39.
4 Id. For a discussion of the regulatory requirements in the United States, see PEW INITIATIVE ON
FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, ISSUES IN THE REGULATION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS AND
ANIMALs (2004); D.L. Uchtmann, Starlink TM-A Case Study ofAgricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159 (2002). For a discussion of the regulatory requirements in
the European Union, see Margaret Rosso Grossman, Traceability and Labeling of Genetically
Modified Crops, Food, and Feed in the European Union, 1 J. OF FOOD L. & POL'Y 43, 43-71 (2005)
(detailing treaties and legislation leading to issuance of a European Commission Recommendation
on coexistence measures); Margaret Rosso Grossman & A. Bryan Endres, Regulation of
Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union, 44 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 378, 393-403
(2000) (providing additional detail regarding European Union Directives 90/219 and 90/220).
207
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
the segregation of crops into GM and non-GM derived material was not a
government imposed safety requirement, but rather a market-based
response to consumer and interest group pressure to develop a system to
provide consumers an opportunity to avoid consumption of GM crops and
their derivatives.5  Economic incentives drove initial supply chain
segregation efforts to differentiate products and services from competitors
and derive a market advantage from the supply of non-GM products.6
A. Importance of Coexistence to Agricultural Trade
In light of this market-based incentive to provide an alternative to
genetically modified products, the uninterrupted trade in agricultural
commodities depends increasingly upon the ability of all participants in
the supply chain to deliver genetically pure products (i.e., within
established tolerances for adventitious presence of genetically engineered
DNA). 7 Previous trade interruptions from the inadvertent introduction of
Starlink corn into the food supply8 and, more recently, international
commodity shipments containing unapproved varieties of genetically
engineered Btl0 corn,9 create potential legal and economic liabilities for
all actors in the agricultural supply chain.'0  Due to the nature of their
5 See Graham Brookes, Co-existence of GM and non GM crops: economic and market
perspectives, at 1, available at http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/pdf/Coexistencepaper_01.pdf;
Recommendation 2003/556, art. 1.2, 2003 O.J. (L189) 39.
6 See Brookes, supra note 5, at 1.
7 See Thomas P. Redick & Michael J. Adrian, Do European Union Non-TariffBarriers Create
Economic Nuisances in the United States, 1 J. FOOD L. & POLICY 87 (2005) (describing
consequences of coexistence and traceability measures to the international shipment of commodity
crops); A. Bryan Endres, Revising Seed Purity Laws to Account for the Adventitious Presence of
Genetically Modified Varieties: A First Step Towards Coexistence, 1 J. FOOD L. & POLICY 131
(2005) (describing and comparing the effectiveness of state, federal, and European seed laws in
obtaining coexistence objectives).
8 See Uchtmann, supra note 4, at 202-211 (providing a comprehensive review of the legal issues
surrounding the Starlink controversy). See also Endres, supra note 7, at 132 and n.6 (describing
other coexistence failures involving the food supply).
9 See A. Bryan Endres, Risk Management Strategies for Identity Preserved Grain Exports, AGRIC.
L (Ill. St. Bar Ass'n) Sept. 2005, at 1. See also Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology,
Syngenta Agrees to Settlement with USDA on Unintended Btl0 Corn, (on file with the author)
available at http://pewagbiotech.org/newsroom/summaries/display.php3?NewslD=868 (detailing
reports of a $375,000 fine and requirement that Syngenta, the developer of Btl0, sponsor a
compliance training conference).
10 See Redick & Adrian, supra note 7, at 107-117; Endres, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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contractual relationships, however, farmers often have the highest liability
exposure from these events.II
B. Coexistence and Second Generation Genetic Engineering
Initial commercialization of genetic engineering events was limited
" See Redick & Adrian, supra note 7, at 113. During the first wave of seeds developed with the
assistance of genetic engineering, contractual agreements dominated relationships between
stakeholders in the agricultural production system. Contract-based relationships, although often an
efficient method of reducing transaction costs, may result in real and/or perceived inequities in the
marketing and production of both genetically engineered and conventional crops. Skeptics often
highlight these inequities, and existing scientific uncertainty, when exerting pressure on legislative
officials to adopt measures aimed at restricting biotechnology. See A. Bryan Endres, State
Authorized Seed Saving: Political Pressure and Constitutional Restraints, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
323, 339-341 (2004). In addition, farmers face little recourse if the seeds planted contain unlabeled
genetically modified varieties. Seed laws do not require labeling of the adventitious presence of
genetically modified varieties below a 5% threshold. Many export markets, however, mandate zero
tolerance for unapproved varieties and less than 1% adventitious presence for approved genetically
modified varieties. See Endres, supra note 7, at 161. Most identity preserved contracts have
similar requirements. Accordingly, seed labels may not provide the necessary information for
farmers to obtain production goals. See Endres, supra note 7, at 161. Contracts to purchase seed,
however, generally "disclaim" all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular
purpose, or any other matter. See Moorer v. Hartz Seed Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (M.D.
Ala. 2000) (upholding disclaimer of implied warranties in seed purchase agreements).
A cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent suppression, however,
could supplant the commercial code and its attendant limitation of remedies. Id. at 1294, n.2.
Possible actionable representations might be statements that the seed was free of genetically
engineered DNA or that the adventitious presence was below the threshold amount required for
import to the European Union. Fraudulent suppression could include failure to disclose known
information that the seed might contain unapproved genetic events. Recent revelations regarding
the presence of Btl 0 corn varieties (an unapproved variety similar to approved Bt 11 varieties)
could support claims of fraudulent suppression of material facts if the seed developer knew of the
defect and had a duty to disclose the facts to purchasers. See also, New Zealand House of
Representatives, Report of the Local Government and Environment Committee, Inquiry into the
alleged accidental release ofgenetically engineered sweet corn plants in 2000 and subsequent
actions taken (on file with author) (detailing testing procedures and extent of seed company's
knowledge of adventitious presence of unapproved genetically engineered DNA in imported sweet
corn seed).
Legislative attempts to level the playing field have met considerable resistance. For
example, the Vermont legislature recently amended its seed act to require labeling of seeds
containing genetically engineered material. 6 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 644(a)(4) (2006). Under the
Act, the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to develop labeling rules, including, arguably,
authority to impose a labeling tolerance for GM presence below the 5% threshold in place for other
seeds. Under pressure from several agribusiness organizations, the Secretary has not required
labeling beyond the 5% threshold. Andrew Barker, Kerr Changes Course on Seed Labeling Law,
VERMONT GUARDiAN, Jan. 7, 2005.
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to agronomic qualities such as herbicide tolerance (e.g., Roundup Ready)
or insect resistance (e.g., plant incorporated pesticides such as Bacillus
thuringiensis or "Bt"). Assuming varieties incorporating these
characteristics obtained full regulatory approval, coexistence failures
resulted in economic concerns rather than food or environmental safety
liabilities.12 Second generation agricultural biotechnology products extend
beyond the relatively benign genetic engineering events of herbicide
tolerance or insect resistance and introduce pharmaceutical and industrial
compounds into agricultural commodities that also constitute human food
or animal feed.' 3 As genetic engineering technologies produce these more
powerful transformation events, the liability paradigm of failing to achieve
coexistence transitions from pure economic losses to potential health and
safety concerns. Accordingly, in the next generation of agricultural
biotechnology, the importance of coexistence, and the attendant liability
for failure to achieve it, will increase drastically.
II. COEXISTENCE (OR STATUTORY GROWER PROTECTIONS) IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Although facially directed at protecting the viability of all
production methods, existing coexistence measures in the European Union
almost exclusively focus on limiting the ability of farmers to plant, harvest
and sell genetically engineered grain and oilseeds. In other words, the
burden of coexistence falls entirely upon those choosing to adopt
genetically engineered production methods.
A. Commission Recommendation 2003/556
In July 2003, the European Commission issued a series of
technical and procedural recommendations directed to Member States for
the development of national legislation to implement coexistence
12 See Grossman, supra note 4, at 72; Endres, supra note 7, at 133.
13 For a background discussion of the potential economic consequences of pharmaceutical crops to
farmers and rural communities, see ROBERT WISNER, THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL CROPS
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strategies.14 Although the recommendations stressed cooperation and "an
equitable balance between the interests of farmers of all production types,"
the Commission also noted that farmers "who introduce the new
production type [presumably GM production] should bear the
responsibility of implementing the farm management measures necessary
to limit gene flow."' 5 Recommended "on-farm measures" included
isolation distances, buffer zones to complement isolation, pollen traps or
barriers, crop rotation systems, use of varieties with reduced pollen
production or male sterility, control of volunteers, and limiting sharing of
equipment to only other farmers adopting GM production methods.!6
Regional measures also play an important role in the
Commission's coexistence recommendations. Specifically, the
Commission suggested "[v]oluntary clustering of fields of different farms
for the cultivation of similar crop varieties (GM, conventional or organic)
in a production area" as a means of achieving significant cost reductions
related to the segregation of GM and non-GM production types.' 7
Although recommended as a last-resort by the Commission,' regional
measures placing bans on GM cultivation have come to dominate most
Member State implementation plans.
B. A Sample of Member State Implementing Legislation
i. Italy
Regional measures appear to be the favorite coexistence tool in
Italy-specifically the creation of GM-Free zones. Fifteen of the twenty
regional parliaments, comprising eighty percent of the territory, have
banned cultivation of genetically engineered crops.19 In addition, the
national government has ratified at least one regional parliamentary
14 See Commission Recommendation 2003/556, 2003 O.J. (L189) 36.
"s Id. art. 2.1.7, at 41.
16 Id. art. 3.2.1, at 45. For a more complete discussion of coexistence measures in the European
Union and the basis for these measures in the founding treaties of the European Union, see
Grossman, supra note 4, at 47-53.
17 Commission Recommendation 2003/556, arts. 3.3.2 & 3.3.3, 2003 O.J. (L189) 46.
' Id. art. 2.1.5, at 41.
19 See GMO-Free Europe, Italy, available at http://www.gmofree-europe.org/countries/Italy.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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decision to ban genetically engineered crops. Common justifications for
the regional bans include a desire to protect human health and the
environment, as well as to "maintain and preserve the presence of natural
genes."20
ii. Germany
In 1993, Germany enacted one of the first national laws, known as
"GenTG," regulating the use of genetically modified organisms.21 More
recently, the German parliament, via a slim majority, amended GenTG to
include coexistence principles.2 2  Key facets of the law encompass
transparency, best management practices, and strict liability.23 Operators
(e.g., farmers) planning to cultivate genetically engineered seed must
notify "the competent federal authority ... no earlier than nine months and
no later than three months prior to cultivation." 24 The competent federal
authority must maintain a listing, accessible to the public via the Internet,
of fields planted with genetically engineered seed.25
In addition, the revised law mandates good farming practices for
preventing the adventitious presence of genetically engineered DNA in
conventional and organic crops.26 Specific measures include minimum
crop separation distances, control of volunteers, natural pollen barriers,
and spatial separation for transport and storage of genetically engineered
seeds and harvested crops. 27
The most controversial aspect of the revised law is the
2o Regional Law on the Subject of Genetically Modified Organisms (Tuscany), L.R. 6 Apr. 2000,
no 53. An English language translation is available at http://www.gmofree-
europe.org/PDFs/TuscanyLaw.pdf.
21 See A. Bryan Endres, GMO: Genetically Modgied Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obligation?
The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Union, 22 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 453, 475 (2000).
22 See Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Amendment to the Genetic Engineering Act:




24 GenTG § 16a(2)(3).
25 Id. § 16a(4).
26 Id. § 16(b).
27 Id. § 16b(3).
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establishment of strict liability for economic injury, even if an operator
follows all applicable "good farming practices." Economic injuries
include instances in which a conventional or organic farmer is unable to
place a crop on the market, may only market the harvest if labeled with a
reference to genetic modification, or is no longer able to label the product
as "organic." 29  If several neighbors may have caused the marketing
impairment, joint and several liability applies unless it is possible to divide
the compensation among the neighbors adopting GM production
methods. o
In addition, voluntary efforts are a popular method for achieving
coexistence in Germany. In January 2004, a German environmental group
launched the "Faire Nachbarschaft" (fair neighborhood) campaig to
encourage farmers and other landowners to establish GM-free zones. To
date, almost 70 GM-Free zones have been established linking over 11,000
conventional and organic farmers representing 430,000 hectares.3 2 This
campaign built upon a previous effort started in 1999, "Keine Gentechnik
auf kommunalen Fltchen/Keine Gentechnik auf Kirchenland" (No
Biotech on communal land, no Biotech on church land).33 Over thirty
communities and the protestant church in Germany have pledged not to
grow or allow the cultivation of genetically engineered crops on their
land.34




29 GenTG § 36a(1).
30 Id. § 36a(4). These amendments remain controversial and some commentators predicted that the
strict liability and public register provisions would be repealed if the Schroder government failed to
retain its control after the 2005 election. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Germany
Biotechnology Annual 2005, June 15, 2005, GAIN Report No. GM5027, available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200507/14613031l.pdf. As of this writing, it remains to be seen
whether the new coalition government will address this issue. For additional information regarding
liability measures in Germany, see Endres, supra note 21, at 475-478.
31 See GMO-Free Europe, Germany, available at http://www.gmofree-
europe.org/countries/germany.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
32 See id. A recent report by the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, however, approximated the
total GMO-free area to be only 1,000 hectares, located in Bavaria and primarily composed of
frassland for dairy production. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, supra note 30.See id.
34 See id.
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iii. Denmark
Denmark recently enacted a far-reaching law to compensate
farmers for economic losses if genetically modified material is found in
conventional or organic produced crops. 35 If the presence of GM material
exceeds 0.9%, the threshold for labeling products containing genetically
modified material,36 the government will reimburse the farmer the price
differential between the market price of a crop produced via genetic
engineering and an unlabeled (non-GM) product.37  Denmark's
compensation fund is financed wholly by an annual tax on farmers of 100
Danish Krones per hectare of land cultivated with GM crops.38 In addition
to the tax, the offending farmer may be subject to civil or criminal liability
under other Danish laws, and the government may seek recovery for
monies paid by the compensation fund.39
III. COEXISTENCE THROUGH GROWER DISTRICTS--ONE APPROACH IN THE
UNITED STATES
Grower districts attempt to formalize the consolidation of
agricultural production practices within geographic regions to minimize
potential commingling of products and to preserve market access.
Historic examples of grower districts organized by commodity type in the
United States include cotton40 and rapeseed.4 1 Areas declared "GM-Free,"
although not termed a "grower district" by the authorizing legislation,
3s See European Commission, Press Release, Commission Authorises Danish State aid to
Compensate for Losses due to Presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic Crops, Nov. 23,
2005, available at http://www.gmwatch.org/archive2.asp?arcid=5980 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
36 See Parliament & Council Regulation 1829/2003, arts. 12(2), 24(2), 2003 O.J. (L268) at 11,16.
37 See European Commission, supra note 35.
38 See id. One hundred Danish Krones equal approximately $16.
39 See id. Ireland recently released a draft coexistence program containing a similar compensation
fund to reimburse farmers facing economic losses as a result of commingling with genetically
engineered DNA above the labeling threshold. The proposal envisioned a state financed
compensation fund that operates on a cost recovery basis with contributions from the beneficiaries
of GM crops (i.e. the GM crop grower, biotech companies and other industrial beneficiaries).
Department of Agriculture and Food, COEXISTENCE OF GM AND NON-GM CROPS IN IRELAND 127-
29 (2005), available at http://www.agriculture.gov.ie/publications2005/gm_coexistence/report.pdf.
40 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52851 (Deering 2006).
41 IDAHO ADMiN. CODE r. 02.06.13.050 (2005) (rule establishing rapeseed districts in Idaho).
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serve a similar purpose by creating a geographically distinct area of non-
GM production practices purportedly for the benefit of conventional and
organic growers. Establishment of GM-Free zones also could be termed
"coexistence thru prohibition." Some recent state statutes revoke local
powers to create "GM-Free" jurisdictions42 and establish, at a minimum,
an inference that genetically engineered production practices are welcome
and may even temper the ability of some non-GM growers to seek redress
for injuries (e.g., private or public nuisance) via the courts. 43
A. Non-Biotech Related Grower Districts
i. Idaho Rapeseed Districts
Although perhaps most famous for their potatoes, Idaho farmers
also produce large amounts of two types of rapeseed. Regulators
traditionally classify rapeseed varieties based on the erucic acidity level.
Low erucic acid rapeseeds, containing less than 2% erucic acid, are
considered edible (also known as canola), whereas high erucic acid
rapeseeds, containing greater than 40% erucic acid, are used exclusively in
the production of industrial oils.44
For the purpose of rapeseed farming, Idaho is divided
geographically into seven production districts. Farmers in districts I, V,
VI, and VII may only plant edible rapeseed varieties while farmers in
districts II and III may only plant industrial rapeseed. No rapeseed of
either variety may be planted in district IV.45 Certain exemptions may
permit the planting of off-varieties (or in the case of district IV the
planting of any variety). To maintain coexistence with off-varieties,
farmers must secure written approval from bordering farmers and establish
a one-mile buffer zone.46
42 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text and Appendix A.
43 For a discussion of general nuisance principles in the context of agricultural biotechnology, see
Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 215, 230-235 (2002); Endres, supra note 21, at 491-494 (2000).
44 IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 02.06.13.004.
45 Id. at r. 02.06.13.100.
46 Id. at r. 02.06.13.100.03.
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ii. Washington Rapeseed Districts
Rapeseed producers in Washington must follow similar state-
imposed grower restrictions. 4 The Director of the Washington
Department of Agriculture has divided the state into twelve geographic
districts.48 Rapeseed production may not commence until a separate
"rapeseed production district" is established within a geographic district
by means of a petition of at least five farmers. 49 In addition, the director
must promulgate regulations for each district, which outlines the varieties
that may be grown and necessary control measures to ensure coexistence
with other districts.50
Local boards, comprised of five to seven members, regulate each
rapeseed production district.5' A majority of the board must be rapeseed
producers, with one member representing industry interests and an
additional, nonvoting advisory member from Washington State University
Cooperative Extension.52  The local board determines the dominant
rapeseed variety for the district and any subdistricts.53 In addition, the
local board may grant petitions for "off type" rapeseed production so long
as the petitioner maintains an isolation distance of one-half mile and
submits a signed statement from all landowners or operators within the
buffer zone, affirming that those within the buffer zone will not plant a
conflicting crop during the proposed crop year.54
Farmers in Districts 1, 2, and 7 have not yet organized themselves
into production districts and, accordingly, cultivation of rapeseed is
prohibited." Districts 3-6 and 8-12 currently have organized production
districts and permit the cultivation of only low erucic acid rapeseed. 6
District 6 is divided further into subdistricts A and B. Rapeseed
production is prohibited in subdistrict A, while low erucic acid rapeseed is
4See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-570-010 to -040 (2005).
48 Id. § 16-570-020(2).
49 Id. § 16-570-020(1).
5o Id. § 16-570-020(3).
s' Id. § 16-570-020(3)(b).
52 Id.
s3 Id. § 16-570-030(1)(d).
4 Id. § 16-570-030(1).
" Id § 16-570-040(1).
56 Id. § 16-570-040(2).
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permitted in subdistrict B.
iii. California Cotton
In order to protect the planting and processing of cotton within the
state, the California legislature created a single variety cotton district in
1967, renaming the area in 1990 the San Joaquin Valley Quality Cotton
District.58 Subject to several exemptions, only two varieties of cotton may
be grown in the district-Acala and Pima. 9 The legislature declared the
unpermitted planting of other varieties "an irreparable injury to the
adjoining or neighboring growers." 60
Ten elected cotton growers, six elected industry members, and one
citizen appointed by the California Secretary of Agriculture comprise the
San Joaquin Valley Cotton Board.6 1 The board is responsible for testing
and approving cotton varieties and proposing changes to quality standards,
subject to approval by referendum vote.62 For coexistence purposes,
growers of naturally colored cotton must adhere to isolation distances of
five miles from white cotton grown for seed and one mile for any other
white cotton.63 An individual grower, however, may plant colored cotton
up to 200 feet from the grower's own white cotton, provided the white
cotton is not used for the production of planting seed.64
B. Biotech-Based Grower Districts
Several commentators have noted the possibility of similar state-
mandated or voluntary grower districts as a means of fostering coexistence
with genetically engineered commodity crops.6 5 To date, however, most
5 Id. § 16-570-040(3).
58 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 52851.
59 d
60 id
61 Id. § 52871.
62 Id. § 52891.
63 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 3818.3 (2005).
64 Id.
65 See Thomas P. Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for Improving Global
Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 36-37 (2003); Thomas P. Redick, Biopharming,
Biosafety, and Billion Dollar Debacles: Preventing Liability for Biotech Crops, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 115, 143-146 (2003); Grossman, supra note 43, at 246-47.
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grower district schemes in the United States are not attempts to foster
coexistence of conventional, organic, and genetically modified production
practices but rather outright prohibitions--either banning cultivation of
genetically modified seeds or, more recently, preempting local
government's ability to regulate the use of genetic engineering.
i. GM-Free Areas-Are they really "Grower Districts?"
In the absence of state leadership on coexistence, some counties 6 6
have exercised their police powers to create GM-Free jurisdictions.
Perhaps the most famous (or notorious, depending upon your perspective)
is Mendocino County, California. In 2004, over 56 percent of the
population voted in favor of a ballot initiative (Measure H), making
Mendocino the first county in the United States to make it unlawful to
"propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically modified organisms."67
Mendocino is a mountainous, coastal county with 150 organic farms and
wineries that comprise one-sixth of the county's agricultural land.68
Organic growers strongly supported the ban arguing that their relatively
high value crops risked certification and loss of export status if
commingled with genetically engineered DNA.69
Although Marin and Trinity counties followed suit with similar
bans, voters in the more agriculturally-oriented Butte, Humboldt, and San
Luis Obispo counties rejected restrictions on genetically modified
organisms by wide margins.7o More recently, Sonoma County voters, by a
66 In addition to county measures, over 79 towns in Vermont have supported resolutions calling for
moratoria on genetically modified organisms. Vermont Senate Wants Farmers Protectedfrom
Biotech Companies, BEYOND PESTICIDES, Apr. 5, 2004 (on file with the author), available at
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/news/dailynewsarchive/2004/040504.htm.
6 Lisa M. Krieger, Four Counties to Vote on Modiied Crops Ban, State Look at Biotech Issue
Sought, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 13, 2004, at lA.
6 Pesticide Action Network North America, Update, Mendocino Votes on GE Crop Ban, Mar. 1,
2004, available at http://www.panna.org/resources/panups/panup_20040301.dv.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2006).
69 David Kupfer, Organic Consumers Association, Report from the Grassroots-The Mendocino
Victory, Mar. 2, 2004, available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/ge/mendocino031104.cfm.
70 See A. Bryan Endres & Thomas P. Redick, International Agricultural Regulatory Update-EPA
Seeks CAFO Rule Comment and States Preempt Establishment of GM-Free Zones, 10 AGRIC.
MGMT. COMM. NEWSL. 2 (A.B.A.) (Feb. 2006). In addition, Lake County, California supervisors
tabled a vote on a proposed ban of genetically engineered alfalfa. John Jensen, GMO Debate
Comes to Lake County, LAKE COUNTY RECORD-BEE, Aug. 17, 2005 (on file with the author).
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ten-point margin, defeated a November, 2005 referendum that sought to
place a ten-year moratorium on the cultivation of genetically engineered
seed.7 ' Although bordering the GM-free counties of Marin and
Mendocino, Sonoma is a larger, more agriculturally-oriented county than
Marin, with more typical commercial farming than Mendocino. The
degree of commercial agriculture within the county and the successful
adoption of genetic engineering applications in other locations without
widespread environmental harm undoubtedly influenced the vote in
Sonoma.
ii. State Preemption of Grower Districts
Contrary to the prediction that states would increase restrictions on
the use of genetic engineering in agriculture to protect access to traditional
export markets,72 most state-level actions regarding genetic engineering in
the past year have instead promoted adoption of the technology by
preempting local restrictions. Many recently enacted statutes note the
fragmentation of regulation in California73 and seek to prevent local
governments from establishing a foothold for GM opponents. These
statutes protect farmers currently using GM technology and seek to
preserve the ability of farmers to choose GM production methods in the
future. A list of the states adopting these statutes and the relevant
statutory language is in Appendix A.
As witnessed by the debates in the seven California counties
described above, there is little chance that a county with a significant
Supporters of the ban were concerned that they would have to impose buffer zones on their land to
preserve organic status if neighbors decided to plant a genetically modified variety of alfalfa. Id.
The ban would not include any other genetically engineered plant or animal. Id.
71 See Jim Doyle, Backers ofBan on Bioengineered Crops Regroup after Failure at Polls; Future
Efforts may Deal with Labeling, Blocking State Law, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 2005, at B5.
72 See Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops, supra note 65, at 36-37.
73 As of this writing, the California legislature is considering two bills (Assembly Bill 1508 and
Senate Bill 1056) that seek to preempt local regulation of genetic engineering. Some opponents of
genetic engineering, in anticipation of the preemptive effect of the proposed legislation and
invalidation of the ordinances in Marin, Mendocino, and Trinity counties, have shifted their focus
to county-level liability provisions. Rather than ban the use of genetically modified organisms,
these initiatives attempt to impose liability on the seed developer for any environmental or
economic damage that may result from the release of genetically modified organisms. At least one
ballot initiative is planned in Humboldt County for 2006.
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amount of commodity agriculture would adopt a GM-Free ballot initiative.
Voters in Butte, Humboldt, San Luis Obispo, and Sonoma defeated GM-
Free resolutions. In contrast, the counties presently restricting cultivation
of genetically modified crops never had significant GM production in the
first place. These bans only reinforced preexisting market-based
agricultural development that favored exclusion of genetically engineered
production practices.
In light of the remoteness of the possibility of an agricultural
community voting to restrict cultivation of genetically engineered seeds,
these preemptive statutes at the state level may be excessive at best, and at
worst, hinder the ability of local producers and governments to adapt to
changing market conditions and exploit developing niche markets for
agricultural products. 74  For example, demand for organic products has
expanded from $3.5 billion to $10.3 billion in annual sales 7 5 -at least part
of which can be attributed to consumer avoidance of genetic
engineering, 76 despite current general acceptance (or ambivalence) by
most members of the public to food and feed derived from agricultural
biotechnology.7 7 From a producer perspective, farmgate price premiums
for some organic crops approach 100%.78 Localities wishing to capture
these price premiums, or react quickly to changes in public perception of
genetic engineering, could be unduly restrained by these broadly worded
74 An example of a locality-based agricultural product that successfully overcame mere commodity
status by legislatively-imposed growing restrictions is the Vidalia onion variety from Vidalia,
Georgia. See GA. CODE ANN. § 2-14-130 et seq. (establishing the Vidalia Onion Act of 1986).
75 See Carolyn Dimitri & Lydia Oberholtzer, Organic Price Premiums Remain High, AMBER
WAVES, Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/September05/Findings/OrganicPrice.htm
76 Kathleen Delate, Organic Agriculture at 1-2 ("Much of the increase in consumption worldwide
has been fueled by consumers' demand for GMO-free products. Because GMOs are disallowed in
organic production and processing, organic products are automatically segregated as GMO-free at
the marketplace."), available at
http://extension.agron.iastate.edu/sustag/pubs/OrganicAgriculture-Brochurel l.doc; Lydia Zepeda
et al., Organic Food Demand: A Focus Group Study Involving Caucasian and African-American
Shoppers at 14.
n See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS: 2004 Focus
GROUPS & POLL, available at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2004update/overview.pdf (finding
that for the most part Americans remain relatively uninformed about genetically modified foods
and that both support for and opposition to introducing genetically modified foods into the food
supply remained relatively steady from 2003 to 2004).
78 See Dimitri & Oberholtzer, supra note 75.
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preemption laws.
C. Voluntary Grower Districts-The Missouri Experiment
The Missouri legislature, in contrast to the preemptive measures
enacted by many states, ratified the ability of local groups to determine the
status of cultivation of genetically engineered products. In 2005, the
legislature amended the Agricultural and Animals code to allow the
voluntary creation of growers' districts by producers. 79  The statute
specifically allows the creation of a district for the production of crops for
industrial or pharmaceutical uses.80 In addition, farmers have authority to
create an agricultural district for virtually any agricultural crop raised for
food or feed, ' including perhaps, organic or GM-Free production zones.
The district's organizers may adopt bylaws to govern production82
and, presumably, enforce the purposes of the district. It is unclear if a
producer may join the district but later "drop out." The statute, however,
does not allow the district to "force any private property owner to
participate in a growers' district."83 The inability to compel membership
may impact the district's effectiveness due to the need for geographical
contiguity in order to comply with mandatory setbacks (e.g., industrial or
pharmaceutical production)84 or preserve varietal purity (e.g., identity
preserved specialty contracts).
Although it remains to be seen how many voluntary districts will
form (the author is not yet aware of any), and if the districts tend to favor
or exclude genetic engineering technologies, the legislation at least
provides local groups the opportunity to organize and capture additional
profits from growing specialty crops in relative isolation.
7 Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 261.256-259 (2005).
s0 Id. § 261.256.
82 id.
83 id
84 See 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(c)(2) (2006); USDA, APHIS letter dated January 14, 2004 to Permit
Applicants, sec. 3 (Experimental Design, Confinement, and Supplemental Permit Conditions),
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/pdf/01 1404.pdf.
8 See 7 C.F.R. § 205.201 (a)(5) (2006) (requiring management practices and physical barriers to
prevent commingling of GMOs and other non-organic items during production of organic
products); see also Endres, supra note 7, at n. 17 and accompanying text (discussing identity
preserved production).
221
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
IV. A LICENSING APPROACH TO COEXISTENCE-THE RICE DEBATE
Advances in genetically modifying the rice genome have generated
a new round of controversy, especially when commingling of the
genetically modified variety could threaten export markets or long-term
supply arrangements. In contrast to geographically based "grower
districts," some states have adopted rice "licensing" schemes to protect
existing non-genetically engineered rice production and, incidentally,
prohibit rice varieties genetically engineered to produce pharmaceutical
compounds.
A. The California Rice Commission and the California Rice Certification
Act
In 1998, the California legislature established the California Rice
Commission ("CRC") to "promote the sale of rice, educate and instruct the
wholesale and retail trade with respect to proper methods of handling and
selling rice, and conduct scientific research."86  Creation of a rice
commission was consistent with other councils and commissions
previously created by the California legislature to promote other
agricultural commodities.
The CRC, composed of rice handlers and growers, has the
authority to create bylaws, rules, and regulations to effectuate the purposes
of the act.87 In addition, the CRC may commence civil actions to obtain
injunctive relief or compel specific performance of any regulations
adopted pursuant to the enabling legislation.88
The original Act that established the CRC noted the "potential" of
the rice industry to be one of the leading segments in the agricultural
economy of California and the need to educate consumers.89  The
California Rice Certification Act of 2000 again acknowledged this
potential but also stressed the importance of ensuring consistency,
maintaining consumer confidence, and "protecting the reputation of
16 Cal. A.B. 623 (1998), Legislative Counsel's Digest.
87 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 71071 (2006).
88 Id. §71132.
9 Id. § 71002.
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California's rice industry throughout the nation and around the world."90
To accomplish these goals, the legislature granted the CRC authority to
"establish the terms and conditions for the production and handling of rice
in order to minimize the potential for the commingling of various types,
and . . . prevent commingling where reconditioning is infeasible or
impossible"-in sum, establish rules for coexistence.9 1
The first step in California's rice coexistence scheme is
"identifying rices that have characteristics of commercial impact."92 The
statute defines characteristics of commercial impact ("CCI") as
characteristics that may adversely affect the marketability
of rice in the event of commingling with other rice and may
include, but are not limited to, those characteristics that
cannot be visually identified without the aid of specialized
equipment or testing, those characteristics that create a
significant economic impact in their removal from
commingled rice, and those characteristics whose removal
from commingled rise is infeasible.93
In the current domestic and international rice markets, all varieties of
genetically engineered rice would satisfy the definition of a variety with
CCI. 94
The statute and accompanying regulations charge a committee
comprised of individuals nominated by the CRC and appointed by the
Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture
("CDFA") with identifying rice varieties with CCI and may recommend
regulations for the planting, producing, harvesting, transporting, drying,
storing, or otherwise handling rice identified as having CCI.95 In addition,
no rice may be sold, distributed, planted, harvested, etc., unless reviewed
9 Id. §§ 55000, 55001.
9' Id. § 55003.
92 Id. § 55040(a).
9 Id. § 55009.
9 See Thomas P. Redick, Biopharning, Biosafety, and Billion Dollar Debacles: Preventing
Liabilityfor Biotech Crops, 8 Drake J. Agric. L. 115, 146 (2003) (discussing the history of the 2000
bill and the status of GM rice in the global market).
9 Id. § 55020; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 2851 (Rice Identity Preservation; Production and
Handling Protocols).
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by the committee.9 6 Finally, any field tests of varieties with CCI must be
approved by the committee to protect against commercial impacts on other
rice.97
In 2002, Ventria Bioscience, formerly known as Phytologics,
commenced discussions with the CRC to plant a variety of rice genetically
engineered to express a gene coding for the protein lysozyme (commonly
referred to as pharma-rice for its pharmaceutical potential). The CRC's
advisory board, by a vote of six to five, recommended a series of protocols
under which Ventria's pharma-rice could coexist within California's
agricultural system. Due to the need for a spri planting, the CRC also
requested an emergency exception from CDFA.9 The Secretary denied
the emergency exception, noting that public input was essential in the
decision to commercialize the first pharmaceutical crop. 00  The Secretary
further justified the decision on the basis that the USDA's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS"), the federal approval authority
for field-testing of genetically engineered plants,o'0 had not yet fully
assessed the potential health and environmental impacts of the pharma-
rice.102 Ventria has since applied for, and received, a permit from APHIS
to conduct field tests of its genetically engineered rice in Scott County,
Missouri and Washington County, North Carolina.' 03
96 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55051.
9 Id. § 55052.
98 California Rice Commission Newsletter, May/June 2004, available at
http://www.calrice.org/downloads/newsletters/CRC Newsletter_2004_05.pdf.
9 See MICHAEL R. TAYLOR ET AL., TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE & FEDERAL ROLES IN THE
OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 96 (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Dec.
2004).
100 Id
101 Permits for the introduction of organisms modified through genetic engineering which are plant
pests or for which there is reason to believe are plant pests (e.g., biopharming crops) are issued by
the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") in accordance with the rules
outlined in 7 C.F.R. § 340.0 thru § 340.9.
102 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 96.
103 See APHIS, Finding ofNo Significant Impact and Decision Notice, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/05_11701 r ea.pdf (granting on June 21, 2005, permission
for a field trial of rice plants genetically engineered to produce lactoferrin); APHIS, Finding ofNo
Significant Impact and Decision Notice, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/05_11702r ea.pdf (granting on June 21, 2005 permission
for a field trial of rice plants genetically engineered to produce lysozyme).
224
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
B. Lessons Learned from the California Experience
Taylor and his co-authors reach several thought provoking
conclusions regarding CDFA's initial rejection of Ventria's petition to
commercialize pharma-rice in California.104 Perhaps most importantly,
Taylor notes that it is difficult to draw "a bright line between the technical
issues of identity preservation and containment and the broader economic
and market integrity concerns that have made pharma-rice
controversial." 05 As further discussed in Section D, infra, Budweiser and
Riceland's opposition to Ventria's request to move field-testing of its
pharma-rice from California to Missouri further illustrates this point.
With respect to purely technical issues, advisory panels "play a
very useful role in bringing relevant expertise and perspectives to bear on
government decisions."'06 In the California example, the implementing
statute charged the advisory body with the sole task of determining the
technical measures necessary to ensure coexistence.!0 7 Advisory bodies,
however, face the same social and political considerations inherent when
multiple industry, consumer and public interests converge over any issue.
In these situations, advisory boards that fail to implement a transparent
and objective review process may subject themselves to claims of industry
capture or self-dealing. The inability of many interested parties to
participate in the decision-making process at the commission level was at
least part of the stated reason for the Secretary's denial of the expedited
permit for Ventria. 08  Transparency and the opportunity for public
comment are critical, particularly on controversial issues, and often
facilitate a fully-documented, rationalized record that ultimately may
produce a more acceptable result to impacted parties.109
C. Arkansas
Following California's lead, the Arkansas legislature, in March
10 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 96.
105 Id. at 98.
106 Id. at 98.
107 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55040(b).
108 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 99.
109 Id.
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2005, adopted a rice certification actl 0 closely resembling the California
example. The statute charges the State Plant Board with "prohibit[ing] or
plac[ing] restrictions on the selling, planting, producing, harvesting,
transporting, storing, processing or other handling of rice identified as
having characteristics of commercial impact.""' The definition of what
constitutes "characteristics of commercial impact" is identical to the
California statute.112
The State Plant Board has authority to appoint a Scientific Review
Committee to identify rice varieties with characteristics of commercial
impact and recommend terms and conditions for planting, harvesting, and
post-farmgate handling of these varieties." 3 The statute, however, neither
delineates the membership composition of the review committee nor sets
the criteria that the committee should use to evaluate acceptable
restrictions on the planting and handing of rice varieties that may have
characteristics of commercial impact. It remains unanswered whether the
review committee will consider public and consumer interests or solicit
public comments. Fortunately, the committee has not yet faced a
controversial petition. At the very least, however, the committee should
establish operating procedures before its first encounter with a variety
having CCI and the attendant escalation of tensions when divergent
interests collide.
D. The Missouri Compromise
Missouri, the nation's fifth largest rice producer,1 4 recently
endured a long battle over the planting of a rice variety with potential
characteristics of commercial impact. Unfortunately, Missouri regulators
lacked explicit statutory guidance, much less an advisory board, to assist
in resolving the dispute. Without an established advisory board or
regulatory committee to serve as an organized forum, competing interest
no See Ark. H.B. 2574, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-15-201 thru 2-15-208. Arkansas is the
number one rice producing state, comprising over forty percent of the total national output. See
Economic Research Service/USDA, Rice Situation and Outlook Yearbook/RSC-2005, Appendix,
Table 8, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?f-field/rcs-bby/
'" ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-15-204(b)(1) (2006).
112 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-15-202(1) with CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 55009.
"3 ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-15-205.
114 Economic Research Service/USDA, supra note 110, at Appendix, Table 8.
226
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
groups aired their disagreements via newspapers, corporate press releases,
and dueling comments submitted to APHIS. A brief summary of the
debate and resulting compromise follows.
i. Colliding Parties
After failing to secure permission to plant its rice in California,
Ventria Bioscience requested a permit from APHIS to plant two varieties
of pharma-rice in Scott County, Missouri.115 175 farmers from southeast
Missouri, where the majority of the state's rice is grown, petitioned the
Missouri Director of Agriculture to oppose the plans." 6 It is unclear if the
director had any legal authority to block Ventria's permit request."17
Riceland Foods, Inc., the world's largest rice miller and marketer
(and largest distributor of Missouri grown rice), with cooperative farms
based in Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Texas, also
objected to Ventria's plans." 8 More importantly, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a
venerable Missouri-based corporation and the nation's largest purchaser of
rice, citing coexistence concerns and negative world-wide consumer
attitudes toward genetic engineering, threatening to "exlud[e] Missouri as
a supply source of rice" if Ventria planted any genetically engineered rice
within the state.'l 9
115 See Animal and Plant Inspection Service, 70 FED. REG. 37,078, 37,079 (June 28, 2005).
116 Alex Jack and Edward Esko, Beer Wars: Anheuser Busch vs. Genetic Rice, AMBER WAVES,
http://www.amberwaves.org/media%2Opages/mediaFiles/beerWars.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).
117 APHIS regulations regarding permits for the introduction of pharma crops require the agency to
"submit to the State department of agriculture of the State where the release is planned, a copy of
the initial [APHIS] review and a copy of the application marked, 'CBI Deleted,' or 'No CBI' for
State notification and review." 7 C.F.R. § 340.4. The regulation, however, is silent as to whether
the state department of agriculture may block a permit or impose additional conditions on the
APHIS permit. A senior APHIS official, however, noted that state officials may add conditions and
in the past have rejected permits otherwise approved by APHIS. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY, PHARMING THE FIELD: A LOOK AT THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF BIOENGINEERING
PLANTS TO PRODUCE PHARMACEUTICALS 21-22, available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/events/0717/ConferenceReport.pdf.
118 See Anheuser-Busch, Ventria Strike Deal on Rice, COLUMBIA DALY TRIBUNE, Apr. 16, 2005,
originally available at http://www.showmenews.com/2005/Apr/2005041News016.asp, now on file
with the author.
119 See Letter from Jim Hoffmeister, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., to Elizabeth E. Gaston, Acting
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (on file with the author); Anheuser-
Busch Starts Rice War, CBS News.com (Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with the author) available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/13/tech/main687708.shtml.
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Ventria, on the other hand, had the continued support of the
Missouri Farm Bureau, Governor Blunt, Senator Kit Bond, and
Representative Sam Graves, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Rural Enterprises, Agriculture, and Technology.120  In addition, the
President of Northwest Missouri State University, Dean L. Hubbard, who
is a recent addition to Ventria's board of directors, pushed for Ventria's
test fields within the state, noting that "any concerns have been addressed
thoroughly to the satisfaction of the scientific community."'21
ii. The Result and Lessons Learned
In April 2005, Anheuser-Busch and Ventria reached a compromise
(the "Missouri Compromise") that would allow Ventria to conduct field-
testing in Missouri while protecting the genetic purity of Anheuser-
Busch's rice supply.122 Specifically, Ventria agreed to plant its pharma-
rice at least 120 miles from any commercial rice growing areas.123
Interestingly, USDA/APHIS later approved Ventria's request to plant in
the heart of Missouri's rice production region.124
The pharma-rice debate provides an interesting case study from a
political-economy perspective. The individual rice farmers in southeast
Missouri, possibly the most affected group, were left unprotected by the
lack of state regulations addressing the introduction of rice varieties with
potential characteristics of commercial impact. Many state officials,
impressed by the potential long-term economic benefit of biopharming,
120 Anheuser-Busch Starts Rice War, supra note 119; Rep. Graves Hails Promise of Ventria, U.S.
FEDERAL NEWS, June 29, 2005, available at http://www.house.gov/graves/newsroom/62905a.htm.121 Anheuser-Busch Starts Rice War, supra note 119.122 See Anheuser-Busch, Ventria Strike Deal on Rice, supra note 118.
123 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Fields ofBio-Engineered Dreams: Can Gene-Altered Rice Help
Rescue the Farm Belt?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005. In January 2006, however, Ventria announced
that is was no longer going to move to Missouri after a package of federal and state grants failed to
materialize. Rachel Melcer, Down on the Biopharm, Missouri Plows Ahead, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 2006.
124 See 70 FED. REG. 37077, June 28, 2005, Ventria Bioscience; Availability of Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Field Tests of Genetically Engineered Rice
Expressing Lysozyme; 70 FED. REG. 37079, June 28, 2005, Ventria Bioscience; Availability of
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Field Tests of Genetically
Engineered Rice Expressing Lactoferrin.
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pushed for approval. 125  Had this occurred in Arkansas or California,
where new varieties of rice are subject to review by a commission or
advisory board comprised, at least in part, by individuals in the rice
industry (planting/milling/processing, etc.), Ventria would have been
required to address specific local concerns. In the absence of state-level
control, USDA/APHIS could approve Ventria's permit without suffering
ramifications from the local farming and business community.
In addition to individual growers, large power-brokers within the
rice industry were also constrained by the lack of a formal approval
process at the state level. Riceland, the largest rice handler in Missouri
and the nation, was powerless to prevent the introduction of the
genetically engineered rice. As a cooperative, Riceland was unlikely to
threaten a boycott of its members in Missouri (and anecdotal evidence
suggests that Riceland expressed opposition only at the prompting of
Anheuser-Busch, the nation's largest rice purchaser). Interestingly, even
if Missouri had an advisory board in place like those in California or
Arkansas, Anheuser-Busch, as a mere consumer of rice, (albeit a very
large one) would have had no representation on the board.
The Missouri Compromise highlighted several important aspects
regarding state regulation of biopharming, in general, and rice licensing
schemes, in particular. First, consumers of rice products may influence
planting decisions. Absent representation on advisory or approval
committees, however, it is unknown if the collective interests of small-
scale market participants possess a voice strong enough to influence the
business decisions of foreign-based corporations or state policymakers.
When Anheuser-Busch advanced a position, on the other hand, decision-
makers in Missouri took note.126
Second, a rice licensing commission in Missouri could have
formalized the debate, allowed rice growers an opportunity to express
their concerns in a forum that would have decision making powers (unlike
125 See Rachel Melcer, Blunt, Panel Meet Today on Biotech Future, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 13, 2005, at C2; Bill Lambrecht, Biotech Firm Puts offRice Crop Here But Company Says It
Plans to Sow Next Year, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2005, at A3. Subsequent studies,
however, have questioned the scope of the economic growth potential in rural areas from
pharmaceutical crops. See generally WISNER, supra note 13.
6 U.S. Representative Emerson, whose constituents include the majority of Missouri rice
growers, also voiced her concerns to the Governor and APHIS. See Press Release, U.S.
Representative Jo Ann Emerson, Emerson: Protect Markets for Missouri Rice (Apr. 15, 2005).
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the ad hoc petition presented to the Missouri Director of Agriculture), and
provided a process for the state-level resolution of future requests for
permits to conduct field tests. Absent a formal approval process, Ventria
or another biopharming firm could by-pass state regulators and request
permission directly from APHIS, despite the side agreement with
Anheuser-Busch, to plant test plots within the 120-mile negotiated buffer.
On the other hand, perhaps the "correct" result occurred without state or
local government intervention in the form of statutes or administrative
regulations. Due to the spatial arrangement of commercial rice production
in Missouri, Ventria is able to plant its test plots in an isolated area with
very little chance of commingling, and Anheuser-Busch will continue to
purchase Missouri-grown rice. The viability of similar negotiated
settlements, however, is questionable in the context of other commodity
crops grown in other states. For example, locating a 120-mile (or even a
10 mile) buffer zone for pharma-corn or soybeans in Illinois or Iowa
would be a daunting task.
Finally, Missouri's sole reliance on APHIS to assess the local risk
potential raises the question of whether states should have their own ex
ante approval process, versus an ex post newspaper debate, when deciding
to permit the introduction of potentially controversial crop varieties.
APHIS did in fact eventually approve the permit for the pharma-rice test
plots even though the proposed location was in the heart of Missouri's rice
production region. If given the opportunity, would the Missouri
Department of Agriculture have approved field trials in this controversial
location? Currently, most states rely solel on the federal government's
scientific assessment of permit applications. 27
Which level of government is most able to handle the political,
social, and economic aspects of pharma test plot approvals is an open
question with a substantial impact on coexistence. Arguably, because
states are more familiar with the intricacies of local economies and social
concerns, they may be in a better position to balance these competing
127 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 42, 44. On a related note, the robust nature of the APHIS
approval process has recently been called to question in an audit report. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
OFFIcE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT: ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE
CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISM RELEASE PERMITS (2005),
available at http://www.usda.gov (search for report number "50601-08-TE").
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interests. 128 What is clear at this point is the need for a formal ex ante
approval process, not ad hoc debates that may neglect or fail to include
important stakeholders. This assumes, of course, that approval authorities
should consider social, economic, and political concerns in the first
instance. 29
The Plant Protection Act expressly preempts state regulation of
any plant pest or noxious weed if APHIS had acted. But Congress
provided exceptions in the statute for state measures consistent with and
not in excess of APHIS requirements.1 3 0 Accordingly, there may be legal
room for state action on plant health issues that are purely local in nature
and not addressed by the federal government.131 Minnesota, for example,
has taken some proactive steps and requires notification and a permit prior
to any field-testing.132 The Commissioner of Agriculture has authority to
accept, condition, or deny permits based on adverse environmental effects
or human harm.133 Oklahoma has a similar statute but exempts petitioners
that have applied for federal approval from the state statutory
128 See Nick Vucinich, California Senate Office of Research, Should California Take a More
Active Role in the Assessment, Monitoring and Oversight ofBiotechnology (2003), available at
http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/reports/comm-studies/biotechfmal.pdf(recommending future study into
the appropriate regulatory role of states).
129 See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 126. Statutory requirements to review varieties for
"characteristics of commercial impact" implicitly affirms the propriety of this type of analysis. For
example, a determination of commercial impact (i.e., the marketability of both the genetically
engineered variety and existing varieties) for new varieties of rice must account for factors beyond
the health or environmental impacts considered by APHIS. See id. at 98 (noting the inherent
subjective component to the concept of "marketability").
130 7 U.S.C. § 7756 (2000). See also USDA/APHIS, Environmental Assessment and Finding ofNo
Significant Impact, Monsanto Company and Forage Genetics International Petition 04-1 10-Op for
Determination of Nonregulated Status for Roundup Ready@ Alfalfa Events J101 and J163, at 9,
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs2?04_1 1001p_com/pdf.
If APHIS grants non-regulated status to a transgenic event, APHIS does not
have any further regulatory authority over this particular transgenic event.
Individual states, on the other hand, often have authority to impose some type
of regulation over various aspects of the agriculture enterprises within their
state, such as establishing some type of production zone, to facilitate
production or marketing of specific crops. APHIS would have no regulatory
authority over the state to require or to forbid such a production zone.
Id.
131 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 40.
132 MINN. STAT. § 18F.07 (2006)
133 MINN. STAT. § § 18F.01-18F.13.
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provisions.134 Although many aspects of a state-level approval process are
probably sufficiently unrelated to APHIS's plant pest review, uncertainty
regarding state authority to impose sui generis regulatory restrictions on a
variety in addition to federal requirements remains.' 35
Resource constraints and a desire to avoid duplicative scientific
assessments may contribute to states' reluctance in requiring permits for
field tests of genetically engineered crops.' 36  Therefore, direct
confrontation regarding oversight is unlikely in the near future, as "state
and federal regulators have a strong interest in coexistence and
collaboration."1'
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Although the commercial application of agricultural biotechnology
has entered its second decade, coexistence issues are only beginning to
emerge. Recent criticisms by the USDA's Inspector General regarding
APHIS oversight of field tests of genetically engineered crops may reflect
a broader problem with federal coexistence strategies. The ambivalence
of the vast majority of domestic consumers toward genetically modified
organisms perhaps provides political justification for a laissez faire
approach to coexistence. The international implications of the
adventitious presence of genetically modified DNA in products marketed
as conventional or organic, however, are significant and unlikely to
disappear in the near future. As a result, states find themselves on the
front lines of the coexistence debate and must attempt to balance rural
economic development (including the purported economic benefits of
biopharming) with potential negative impacts on the viability of existing
identity preserved agricultural markets.
Legislative bans on all forms of genetic engineering within a
jurisdiction, or preemption of any local regulation of agricultural
134 2 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-35-11-42 (West 2003).
' TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 99, at 40, 113-114, 122-123. The Roundup Ready Wheat debate in
the northern-tier states, where the potential loss of export markets, rather than health or
environmental concerns, are the most pressing issues, may present a future battleground on this
issue.
136 Id. at 44.
13 Id. at 114.
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biotechnology, unfortunately provide little guidance on how to ensure the
successful coexistence of agricultural biotechnology with conventional
and organic agriculture.' 38 Variety licensing committees may offer some
hope, however. Committees with the necessary technical competence to
evaluate the impact of novel varieties in local environmental conditions,
and political awareness to consider economic and market integrity
concerns, ultimately could produce constructive guidance for achieving
coexistence. Moreover, the fact-finding ability of variety licensing boards
could provide a transparent forum for public comment while protecting
confidential business information. Another promising alternative may be
legislative backing for organization of voluntary grower districts under the
Missouri model. This law may provide sufficient incentives for growers of
sensitive crops (e.g. field trials, biopharming, organics) to establish long-
term relationships via production contracts.1 39
On thing remains clear in the current environment-all of the
burden for coexistence cannot be transferred to farmers, as "no matter how
conscientious farmers (or workers later in the distribution chain) are,
adventitious presence will almost invariably still exist." 40 Although
farmers must play a predominant role in achieving coexistence, legal
structures, based on scientific research and a realistic view of international
market conditions, must be in place to provide the foundation for
successful coexistence efforts.
138 But see Redick, supra note 94, at 117 (recommending the use of grower districts or regional
moratoria to reduce the costs of identity preservation in the production of pharmaceutical crops).
13 Conversation with Thomas P. Redick, Apr. 4, 2006. For a discussion of production contracts
and the impact on farmers, see generally Neil D. Hamilton, Reaping What We Have Sown: Public
Policy Consequences ofAgricultural Industrialization and the Legal Implications of a Changing
Production System, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 289 (1997) and Neil D. Hamilton, State Regulation of
A icultural Production Contracts, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1051 (1995).
" Drew L. Kershen & Alan McHughen, CAST Commentary, Adventitious Presence, July 2005,
http://www.cast-science.org/cast/src/cast-top.htm (follow "adventitious presence" hyperlink). See
also Endres, supra note 7, at 133 (noting the importance of genetic purity in seeds, an input beyond
the control of most farmers, in achieving coexistence).
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Appendix A:
State Statutes Preempting Local Authority to Regulate Genetically
Engineered Seeds
i. Arizona. SB 1282, codified at A.R.S. § 3-243.
"The provisions of this article and the rules that implement this article are
of statewide concern. The regulation of seeds pursuant to this article is not
subject to further regulation by a county, city, town or other political
subdivision of this state."
ii. Florida. HB 1717, codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 570.07.
"In order to ensure uniform health and safety standards, the adoption of
standards and fines in the subject areas of paragraphs (a)-(n) is expressly
preempted to the state and the Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services. Any local government enforcing the subject areas of paragraphs
(a)-(n) must use the standards and fines set forth in the pertinent statutes or
any rules adopted by the department pursuant to those statutes."
Note: paragraph (g) provides the department authority over:
"Registration, labeling, inspection, germination testing, and sale of seeds,
both common and certified."
iii. Georgia. SB 87, codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 2-11-35(1).
"No county, municipal corporation, consolidated government, or other
political subdivision of this state shall adopt or continue in effect any
ordinance, rule, regulation, or resolution regulating the labeling,
packaging, sale, storage, transportation, distribution, notification of use, or
use of seeds."
iv. Idaho. HB 38, codified at IDAHO CODE § 22-413.
"(1) This chapter and its provisions are of statewide concern and occupy
the whole field of regulation regarding the registration, labeling, sale,
234
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
storage, transportation, distribution, notification of use, use of seeds, and
planting of seeds to the exclusion of all local ordinances or regulations.
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, no ordinance or
regulation of any political subdivision may prohibit or in any way attempt
to regulate any matter relating to the registration, labeling, sale, storage,
transportation, distribution, notification of use, use of seeds, or planting of
seeds."
"(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not preempt
county or city local zoning ordinances governing the physical location or
siting of seed facilities."
v. Indiana. HB 1302, codified at IND. CODE § 15-4-1-16.
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), a political subdivision (as
defined in IC 36-1-2-13) may not regulate the advertising, labeling,
distribution, sale, transportation, storage, or use of seeds."
"(b) A political subdivision may, by resolution, petition the state seed
commissioner for a hearing to allow a waiver to adopt an ordinance
because of special circumstances relating to the advertising, labeling,
distribution, sale, transportation, storage, or use of seeds. If a petition is
received, the state seed commissioner shall hold a public hearing to
consider granting the waiver requested. The public hearing must be
conducted in an informal manner. IC 4-21.5 does not apply to a public
hearing under this section."
"(c) If the state seed commissioner, after a public hearing under subsection
(b), grants a political subdivision's petition for a waiver, the political
subdivision may regulate the advertising, labeling, distribution, sale,
transportation, storage, or use of seeds to the extent allowed by the
waiver."
Note: The Indiana statute appears to allow for some localities to opt out of
the state's control over use of seeds, including genetically engineered
seeds. The statute requires the commissioner to hold a public hearing to
consider the waiver, but offers no guidance as to what "special
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circumstances" might warrant granting the petition.
Larry Nees, from the Indiana State Seed Commissioner's office,
explained the petitioning process. Mr. Nees noted that the language in
section (b) of HB 1302 was modeled after similar language in Indiana
fertilizer and pesticide law. There has never been a case of a political
subdivision petitioning the state with regards to a fertilizer, pesticide, or
seed regulation, so Mr. Nees was a bit unsure on how a petition would
progress. In theory, a political subdivision files a petition for a waiver
from the state law regarding seed regulation. A hearing will be set up
locally, in the area where the petition was filed. At the hearing, the
representatives of the political subdivision will make their case. Mr. Nees
said that there are no specific standards; for the most part, the reasoning
behind the local government's request is examined. After the hearing, the
Indian State Chemist and Seed Commissioner, the State Seed
Administrator, and their counsel will meet and make a decision. Ideally,
the decision will be based on scientific, not political reasons. Phone
conversation between Brian George, University of Illinois law student,
and Larry Nees, August 12, 2005.
vi. Iowa. HF 642, codified at IOWA CODE § 199.13A.
"The provisions of this chapter and rules adopted by the department
pursuant to this chapter shall preempt local legislation adopted by a local
governmental entity relating to the production, use, advertising, sale,
distribution, storage, transportation, formulation, packaging, labeling,
certification, or registration of an agricultural seed. A local governmental
entity shall not adopt or continue in effect such local legislation regardless
of whether a statute or a rule adopted by the department specifically
preempts the local legislation. Local legislation in violation of this section
is void and unenforceable."
vii. Kansas. HB 2341, codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-1450.
"On and after the effective date of this section, the provisions of the
Kansas seed law, and any rules and regulations promulgated there under
relating to seed sale or use, including, but not limited to, planting,
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production, use, advertising, sale, distribution, storage, transportation,
formulation, packaging, labeling, certification or registration of an
agricultural seed within the state of Kansas, shall be applicable and
uniform throughout this state and in all cities, counties and political
subdivisions therein. No local authority shall enact or enforce any law,
ordinance, rule, regulation or resolution in conflict with, in addition to, or
supplemental to, the provisions of the Kansas seed law unless expressly
authorized by law to do so. Any law, ordinance, rule, regulation or
resolution in conflict with, in addition to, or supplemental to, the
provisions of the Kansas seed law is hereby declared to be invalid and of
no effect."
viii. North Carolina. HB 671. Conference Committee between
House and Senate appointed August 22, 2005.
"The Board of Agriculture shall have sole authority for the banning of
plants as defined in G.S. 106-202.12(7)."
Subsequently amended to include establishment of a Legislative
Commission on Genetically Modified and Genetically Engineered
Organisms tasked, among other items, to study sufficiency of the current
regulatory framework and the potential for harm to organic and other
agricultural markets.
ix. North Dakota. SB 2277, codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-09.
"A political subdivision, including a home rule city or county, may not
adopt or continue in effect any ordinance, resolution, initiative, or home
rule charter regarding the registration, labeling, distribution, sale,
handling, use, application, transportation, or disposal of seed. This section
does not apply to city zoning ordinances."
x. Ohio. HB 66, codified at OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 907.111(B).
"(B) No political subdivision shall do any of the following:
(1) Regulate the registration, labeling, sale, storage, transportation,
237
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
distribution, notification of use, use, or planting of seed;
(2) Require a person who has been issued a permit or license under this
chapter to obtain a permit or license to operate in a manner described in
this chapter or to satisfy any other condition except as provided by a
statute or rule of this state or of the United States;
(3) Require a person who has registered a legume innoculant under this
chapter to register that innoculant in a manner described in this chapter or
to satisfy any other condition except as provided by a statute or rule of this
state or of the United States."
"(C) No political subdivision shall enact, adopt, or continue in effect local
legislation relating to the permitting or licensure of any person who is
required to obtain a permit or license under this chapter or to the
registration, labeling, sale, storage, transportation, distribution, notification
of use, use, or planting of seed."
xi. Oklahoma. HB 1471, codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 2 § 8-26.1.
"(A) The legislature hereby occupies and preempts the entire field of
legislation in this state touching in any way the regulation and
enforcement of the registration, labeling, sale, storage, transportation,
distribution, notification of use, and use of seeds to the complete exclusion
of any order, ordinance or regulation by any municipality or other political
subdivision of this state."
"(B) No political subdivision shall regulate the registration, packaging,
labeling, sale, storage, distribution, use or application of seeds. No
political subdivision shall adopt or continue in effect local orders,
ordinances, or regulations in this field, except for those relating to taxation
relating to registration, packaging, sale, storage, distribution, use or
application of seeds. Local registration in violation of this section is void
and unenforceable."
xii. Pennsylvania. HB 2387, codified at 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7120.
"(b) Statewide jurisdiction and preemption.--This chapter and its
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provisions are of Statewide concern and occupy the whole field of
regulation regarding the registration, labeling, sale, storage, transportation,
distribution, notification of use and use of seeds to the exclusion of all
local regulations. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter,
no ordinance or regulation of any political subdivision or home rule
municipality may prohibit or in any way attempt to regulate any matter
relating to the registration, labeling, sale, storage, transportation,
distribution, notification of use or use of seeds if any of these ordinances,
laws or regulations are in conflict with this chapter."
xiii. Texas. HB 2313, codified at TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
71.153.
"A political subdivision may not adopt an ordinance or rule that restricts
the planting, sale, or distribution of noxious or invasive plant species."
xiv. West Virginia. SB 580, codified at W. VA. CODE § 19-16-4a.
"(a) No political subdivision may regulate the registration, packaging,
labeling, sale, storage, distribution, transportation or any other use of
seeds."
"(b) No political subdivision may adopt or continue in effect any local
laws, ordinances or regulations relating to the regulating, registration,
packaging, labeling, sale, storage, distribution, transportation or any other
use of seeds."
"(c) Local laws, ordinances or regulations in violation of this section are
void and unenforceable."
xv. Illinois. 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (Counties Code).
Arguably, counties in Illinois are prohibited from creating districts that
prohibit any agricultural production practice. The legislature specifically
withheld authority for counties to "impose regulations, eliminate uses,
buildings, or structures, or require permits with respect to land used for
agricultural purposes ... when such agricultural purposes constitute the
principal activity on the land." 55 ILCS 5/5-12001. Accordingly, county
boards in Illinois may be powerless to create GM-free, GM-only or
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"biopharming" districts. On the other hand, county boards in Illinois do
have authority to "control and eradicate[e] weeds" within their
jurisdictions. 55 ILCS 5/5-1057. The term "weeds" is not defined in the
county enabling statues and could, conceivably, include genetically
engineered crops not approved for certain export markets or plants
engineered to produce pharmaceutical or industrial compounds. The
Illinois Noxious Weed Law, 505 ILCS 100/1-24, however, may preempt
county authority by vesting in the Director of the Department of
Agriculture (among others), the power to determine which plants are
"noxious weeds." Whether "noxious weeds" are a subset of "weeds" or
occupies the entire field of "weeds" is unknown.
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